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1.  Introduction
This paper studies the impact of analyst recommendations of markings from 
the most-fluent stocks quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The main goal of the 
research is to check which of the recommendations significantly influence stock 
prices and what factors affect price reaction (besides the level of recommendation).
Among other information, analyst recommendations set a very interesting 
group. Assuming that recommendations are formulated on the grounds of publicly 
available information, they should not set unexpected events. Nonetheless, a variety 
of brokerage firms and houses spend a lot of money and effort on working out 
detailed recommendations of stocks. This can suggest that professional analysts 
employing advanced analytical methods in constructing their assessments usually 
have greater knowledge than ordinary investors, and their recommendations can 
be valuable to others. An additional question that could be researched is whether 
or not the integrity of analysts who have business connections with specific issu-
ers may intentionally spread manipulated information. Moreover, after compiling 
(but before publishing) a recommendation, analysts can be considered as insiders 
who possess some privileged information. The presence of excess returns directly 
before the publication can be interpreted as a sign of potential illegal insider 
trading. All of the aspects mentioned above make analyst recommendations an 
interesting subject of study. 
The impact of analyst recommendations of stock prices has been researched 
by many authors, who have also endeavored to locate factors that influence the 
strength, direction, and duration of such an impact. Among others, Elton et al. 
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(1986), Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Lin and McNichols (1998), Barber et al. 
(2001), Yazici and Muradoglu (2002), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Jegadeesh and 
Kim (2006), Gurgul and Majdosz (2004), Glezakos (2007), Loh and Stulz (2009), 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010), Murg et al. (2014), and Murg and Zeitlberger (2014) 
have studied this subject based on daily data. Kim et al. (1997), Busse and Green 
(2002), and Green (2006) focus on intraday returns, checking the occurrence of 
instantaneous market reactions to analyst recommendations. The results received 
by the authors vary depending on the researched market, the period under study, 
and the research approach.
The aforementioned studies suggest that analyst recommendations sig-
nificantly influence the price-formation process on developed markets, and the 
direction of price changes is consistent with the information contained in the 
news. BUY recommendations are followed by positive abnormal returns, while 
SELL recommendations lead to negative abnormal returns observed on the day 
of the publication or the following day (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh 
and Kim, 2006; Murg and Zeitlberger, 2014). Beyond an immediate reaction to 
the recommendation, some researchers find a drift in prices that continues in the 
subsequent months after the event (Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006). 
Reactions of small and emerging markets are not so unequivocal. Glezakos (2007) 
and Gurgul and Majdosz (2004) do not find any visible reaction to recommenda-
tions on the Athens Stock Exchange and Warsaw Stock Exchange, respectively. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) confirm a dependence on the strength of the reaction 
and the size of the market, convincing us that a developed market reacts stronger, 
while Murg and Zeitlberger (2014) show the opposite (via examples of the Austrian 
and German stock markets): abnormal returns on the smaller market are higher. 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) suggest that the research should not only involve the 
level of recommendation but also the change from its previous level, as it has more 
robust explanatory power than the level alone. The impact of recommendation is 
especially strong when there are the most-extensive changes, such as an upgrade 
to BUY from SELL or a downgrade to SELL from BUY (Stickel, 1995; Murg et al., 
2014; Murg and Zeitlberger, 2014). Some authors consider additional factors 
that influence investor reaction; one of which the size of the company. Results 
obtained by Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Murg and Zeitlberger (2014), 
and Murg et al. (2014) suggest that the strongest reaction to recommendations 
is observed in the case of small- and medium-sized companies. 
On the U.S. equity market, Womack (1996) analyzes long-run returns for BUY 
and SELL recommendation changes stratified by the size of the firm (measured 
by market capitalization) and graphically shows the differences among compa-
nies of different sizes. Also on the U.S. equity market, Barber et al. (2001) group 
firms into portfolios according to their consensus analyst recommendations and 
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focus on the profitability of investment strategies that involve this consensus. As 
a part of the research, they partition portfolios according to the size of the firm. 
They find that the difference between returns for the most highly rated and least-
favorably recommended stocks is the most expressive in the group of small- and 
medium-sized firms. Studying companies from the Austrian and German equity 
markets, Murg and Zeitlberger (2014) construct a linear regression model with 
the absolute abnormal return as the independent variable and the market capi-
talization (MC) of the firm as an explanatory variable representing the size of 
the firm. All MC coefficients are negative, suggesting that the reaction of smaller 
companies is stronger. A similar analysis is performed on the Austrian market by 
Murg et al. (2014), who consider a model with the same endogenous variable 
but with more exogenous variables; one of which being MC. They also find that 
analyst recommendations have a stronger impact on smaller firms. As mentioned 
by Barber et al. (2001), this relationship between company size and investor reac-
tion is reasoned. The smaller is the firm, the less informed the public is about it 
(and as a result, the more unexpected the recommendation).
Another factor that can potentially influence investor reaction is the reputation 
of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation. Stickel (1995) and Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2006) verify that the reaction is stronger when the recommendation is 
prepared by analysts with better reputations and from larger brokerage houses for 
stocks from U.S. market and G7 countries, respectively. To that end, the authors 
implement different regression models with categorical variables. Some other 
authors conclude that leading analysts avoid giving a SELL recommendation to 
maintain good relations with clients. Moreover, they recommend BUY too often 
when they have some business connections with a specific issuer (Womack, 1996; 
Lin and McNichols, 1998; Barber et al., 2005). This leads to an asymmetric reaction 
of the market to different types of recommendations. Lin and McNichols (1998) 
researched that, on the US market, a HOLD recommendation leads to a negative 
reaction of the market when it is suggested by leading analysts, because inves-
tors suspect that SELL should be warranted. Barber et al. (2005) prove that the 
implementation of NASD Rule 2711 in 2002 (which obligates analysts to display 
the percentage of particular types of recommendation [BUY, HOLD, or SELL]) 
effectively reduced the number of BUYs (which had previously been too many). 
From the Efficient Market Hypothesis point of view, most of the studies 
demonstrate that the market is not semi-strong form efficient in the researched 
countries (not only because there is a post-recommendation drift in prices). On 
some markets, significant abnormal returns are observed directly before the pub-
lication of a recommendation, which suggests some information leakage and the 
presence of preferred customers (Yazici and Muradoglu, 2002; Gurgul and Maj-
dosz, 2004; Murg and Zeitlberger, 2014).
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The impact of analyst recommendations on stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange is researched inter alia by Gurgul and Majdosz (2004), Mielcarz et al. 
(2007), Podgórski and Mielcarz (2008), and Buzała (2012). All of the aforemen-
tioned authors make an inference based on event-study methodology but assum-
ing different models. Conclusions derived from their studies are not consistent. 
Gurgul and Majdosz (2004) consider the sample of 139 BUY, HOLD, and SELL 
recommendations for stocks listed on the WIG20 Index published from 1996 to 
2003. They do not observe any significant abnormal returns after publications 
regardless of the type of recommendation, but significantly negative average excess 
returns appear directly before the publications of SELL recommendations. This 
can be interpreted as some leakage of information. Mielcarz et al. (2007) analyze 
only positive recommendations (BUY and ACCUMULATE) from the 1st of January 
2005 to the 31st of December 2006. Their sample consists of 246 events. In con-
trast to Gurgul and Majdosz (2004), they determine two recommendation issue 
dates: the day when the recommendation was provided to commercial customers 
and the day when the recommendation became public on the Internet. Their 
results are opposite to those obtained by Gurgul and Majdosz (2004) and show 
that BUY recommendations create significantly positive abnormal returns on both 
assumed days of the event. According to this research, the second type of positive 
recommendation (ACCUMULATE) has no impact on stock prices. Podgórski and 
Mielcarz (2008) study only neutral and negative recommendations (for a change); 
cumulatively, 319 events. They analyze the same period as Mielcarz et al. (2007) 
and define issue dates likewise. They conclude that negative events show an 
immediate reflection in stock prices, as significantly negative abnormal returns 
are observed both on the day of delivering the recommendation to commercial 
customers and the day of the official publication on the Internet. They do not 
find any influence of neutral recommendations on the price-formation process. 
Another study in the area of recommendation impact on stock prices on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange is the research of Buzała (2012). 1185 recommendation 
dates gathered by the author cover the period from January 2010 to December 
2012. Recommendations concerning stocks listed on the WIG20 Index are system-
atized in a five-point scale: BUY, ACCUMULATE, HOLD, REDUCE, and SELL. Issue 
dates are defined in two ways, like in Mielcarz et al. (2007). In addition to the 
research of price reaction to the five aforementioned types of recommendations, 
Buzała (2012) checks if changes in the level of recommendation are informative. 
Thereupon, he distinguishes among event upgrades and downgrades. In the 
group of upgrades, he additionally specifies upgrades to BUY, and in the group 
of downgrades, he itemizes downgrades to SELL. His findings indicate that both 
a first issue of an extreme recommendation (BUY or SELL) to a limited group 
of customers as well as its official publication influence stock prices. For other 
127
The reaction of investors to analyst recommendations...
types of recommendations, there are no visible price reactions. Significant price 
changes also appear in groups of upgrades and downgrades. The strongest reac-
tion can be observed in groups of upgrades to BUY and downgrades to SELL. In 
the case of recommendations that are initially delivered to a narrow audience, 
the second public issue is less significant. Post-event drift appears in the cases of 
the most-extreme recommendations (BUY and SELL) as well as in the situation 
of level changes. Significant abnormal returns consistent with the direction of the 
recommendation appear before the day of the event, even in the case of the first 
issue. This is an argument for some leakage of information that leads to a rejec-
tion of the semi-strong effectiveness of the Polish equity market. 
In this paper, the effect of analyst recommendations on security prices is ex-
plored. Recommendations that are researched involve the most-fluent companies 
quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange from January 2012 to September 2015. 
The first part of the study concerns price reaction to positive, neutral, and nega-
tive recommendations. Subsequently, the impact of changes in recommendation 
levels on investor reaction is tested. The tests are conducted with the use of the 
event-study methodology. Finally, additional factors that could affect price reac-
tions are studied.
The study extends foregoing research from the WSE relating to this subject. 
First, it covers the period that has not been the object of such a study as of yet, 
as the last known research on this issue was conducted by Buzała (2012) and 
covers the period of 2010–2011. (this period is analyzed in additional research to 
check if the employed method gives results similar to those acquired by Buzała). 
Second, it examines not only investor reaction to a given level of recommen-
dation but also to level changes. To the best of this author’s knowledge, only 
the research of Buzała attempted to investigate this issue until now. However, 
this research is more detailed than that made by Buzała, as it regards various 
possible level changes, not only upgrades and downgrades. Moreover, all of the 
aforementioned authors employing event-study methodology use parametrical 
test statistics. The validity of the parametrical test is addicted to the fulfillment 
of strict assumptions that very often go unfulfilled. In this research, the problem 
is resolved by subsidiary use of a non-parametrical rank test, which requires 
less-restrictive assumptions. Lastly, as distinct from previous studies, additional 
factors that could influence investor reaction are researched. Next to changes in 
recommendation levels, the size of the company and reputation of the brokerage 
house are analyzed as potential explanatory variables. These factors are pointed 
out as influential by research from other countries. Conterminously with Murg and 
Zeitlberger (2014) and Murg et al. (2014), a linear regression model is employed, 
but it differs significantly from those used by the aforementioned authors. First 
and foremost (as the information is not immediately reflected in security prices), 
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a proper independent variable is chosen. Furthermore, the model contains dif-
ferent dependent variables; particularly, the size of the firm is represented by the 
natural logarithm of company shares in the WIG20 Index.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology applied in the research; empirical results are demonstrated and 
discussed in Section 3; and Section 4 concludes the paper. The appendix contains 
results from the period of 2010–2011 as a comparison to the research conducted 
by Buzała (2012).
2. Data and methodology
The dataset contains 576 analyst recommendations for 28 companies listed 
in the WIG20 Index from the 1st of January 2012 to the 1st of September 2015. 
Recommendations are taken from the database available at www.bankier.pl, which 
contains information about the date of the publication, level of the recommenda-
tion, actual price, target price and price at date of publication, change-in-price 
potential, and name of the issuing institution. 
Recommendations can be expressed in one of two scales. An absolute recom-
mendation is prepared by analysts who estimate a target price and then compare 
it with the current market value. Then, on the basis of underestimation or overes-
timation, they formulate a recommendation such as BUY, ACCUMULATE, HOLD 
(or NEUTRAL), REDUCE, or SELL. When the target price is compared with the 
current valuation of companies from a specified segment or comparative group, 
the recommendation is then relative. Possible recommendations in this group 
are in line with the market, below the market, above the market, or similar. From 
the initial set of 1470 recommendations, 1245 absolute recommendations were 
selected. The number was then reduced to 576 by removing the events that were 
too close in terms of the event-study methodology. Recommendations qualified 
for the final sample were categorized into three major groups: positive (BUY or 
ACCUMULATE), neutral (HOLD), and negative (REDUCE or SELL). Table 1 contains 
the number of recommendations in each of these groups.
To test if analyst recommendations have an impact on security prices, the event-
study methodology was applied. Daily log-returns of the stocks were employed, 
computed from closing prices available on www.gpwinfostrefa.pl. Since the data 
does not contain information about whether or not a particular recommendation 
was previously delivered to privileged customers, the date of the event (designated 
by t = 0) is defined as the day of the publication named in the database. For each of 
the recommendations, pre-event and event windows are defined. Following others 
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(Gurgul and Majdosz, 2004; Murg, Zeitlberger, 2014), we define a pre-event window 
that covers 30 days (from t = −35 to t = −6). The event window contains 11 days 
around the date of the event. It starts five days before the publication (t = –5) to 
capture potential price changes that could indicate information leakage and end 
five days after it (t = 5) to evaluate the speed of price reaction. 
Table 1
The number of absolute analyst recommendations included in the study. All recommen-
dations relate to companies listed in the WIG20 Index from the 1st of January 2012 to the 
1st of September 2015 
Year
Total number  
of recommendations
Positive Neutral 
HOLD
Negative
BUY ACCUMULATE REDUCE SELL
2012 135 40 9 54 9 23
2013 145 33 5 71 7 29
2014 170 66 5 66 6 27
2015 126 24 9 61 3 29
SUM 576 163 28 252 25 108
For each day in the pre-event and event windows, abnormal returns are 
calculated as the difference between the actual return and its expected value:
 
AR R E Ri t i t i t, , ,= − ( )
Ri,t is a logarithmic rate of return of i-th company on day t. Expected returns are 
calculated with the classical market model from the estimation window:
 
R Ri t m t i t, , ,= + +α β ε
where Rm,t is a logarithmic rate of market return represented by WIG20 return and 
εi,t is an error on a given day. Parametric tests drawn on the model assume a nor-
mal distribution of residuals, lack of the autocorrelation, and homoskedasticity. 
Cumulatively, 24% of the data does not satisfy at least one of these assumptions.
Despite the fact that assumptions are not achieved in all cases, estimators 
received from the least-squares method are consistent. Nonetheless their effec-
tiveness may be not satisfactory (Gurgul, 2006), and the applied parametrical 
test may not have assumed t-distribution. Previous research shows that applying 
more-complicated models does not necessarily improve results of the classical 
market model (see Brown and Warner, 1980; Murg et al., 2014). To support the 
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results of the parametric test, a non-parametric rank test (which does not require 
the assumption of abnormal return normality) is employed. For each event, ab-
normal returns are divided by the standard deviation from the pre-event window, 
and thus, are standardized:
 
SAR AR S ARit it i= ( )/  
where
 
S AR ARi
t
it( ) =
=−
−
∑129 35
6
2  
Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional variance of standardized abnormal re-
turns separately in the three defined groups of events. One can notice that there 
is a significant increase of volatility in the event window. This phenomenon is 
frequently observed (Corrado, 2011) and demands cross-sectional variance ad-
justment. Following Corrado and Zivney (1992), adjusted standardized abnormal 
returns are computed; namely:
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SAR S SAR tit
it
it t
′ =
= − … −
( ) = − …

35 6
5 5
, ,
/ , ,
 
where 
 
S SAR
N
SAR SARt
i
N
it t( ) = − −( )=∑
1
1 1
2
 
and N is the number of stocks in the sample.
Cross-sectionally adjusted t-test statistic has the form as in Corrado and 
Zivney (1992):
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N
SARa
i
N
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0
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=
∑
while the non-parametric rank test proposed by Corrado (2011) is defined as:
 T t
N
SAR
n
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CZ
i
N it
0
1
1
1
2
1 12
0( ) =
′( ) − +

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rank
/
 
n is the length of the pre-event window, while rank SARit′( )0  is the rank of the 
adjusted standardized abnormal return of day t0 in the group of 31 standardized 
abnormal returns: 30 from the pre-event window, and the remaining 1 from day t0 
that is SARit′0. The TCZ statistic is asymptotically normally distributed. 
131
The reaction of investors to analyst recommendations...
Figure 1. Cross-sectional variance of standardized abnormal returns in the pre-event  
and event window, separately in three groups of recommendations: positive, neutral, 
and negative
3. Empirical results
3.1. Results from analysis of the standard levels  
of recommendations
In the first step, the recommendations were divided into three clusters: positive, 
neutral, and negative events (as detailed in Table 1). In each of the groups separately, 
the impact of recommendations on security prices was tested with the parametric 
t-test and nonparametric rank test. Mean-adjusted standardized abnormal returns 
SAR′( )  and p-values for both test statistics in the event window are presented in 
Table 2. The number of events in each group is also detailed in the table. 
The strongest reaction of prices can be observed in the case of positive rec-
ommendations. Both test statistics are significantly positive at the 5% level on the 
day of publication and at the 1% level the following day. Two days after the issue 
of recommendation, prices are still influenced by the event (as suggested by the 
significance of the statistics at the 5% level). Adjusted standardized abnormal returns 
remain positive to five days after the event, and the non-parametric test statistic is 
significant also on the fourth and fifth days after the recommendation. This sug-
gests that the market reacts strongly to positive analyst recommendations. Price 
adjustment is not immediate, but it lasts a few days. The parametrical test indicates 
a statistically significant abnormal return five days before the event; but as the sign 
of the return is negative, this is probably triggered by some confounding events.
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In the group of neutral events, abnormal returns remain negative from three 
days before the recommendation to one day after it. However, test statistics around 
the event day are insignificant. This can be a signal to a tentative interpretation 
that hold recommendations have no impact on security prices. Only four days 
before the event and five days after it is the TCZ statistic significantly positive; but 
this seems to have no direct connection to the publication of the recommendation. 
Negative recommendations are marked with negative abnormal returns that 
continue from one day before the recommendation to five days after it. Nonetheless, 
only one of the two test statistics (namely, the parametric t-test statistic) is signifi-
cantly negative at the 5% level on the day of recommendation. The non-parametric 
TCZ statistic has the lowest value of the post-event window, but it is not significant. 
Table 2
Reaction of daily returns to particular types of analyst recommendations (positive, neutral, 
and negative) issued between the 1st of January 2012 and the 1st of September 2015 
t
Positive  
recommendation  
(Buy/Accumulate)
Neutral  
recommendation  
(Hold)
Negative  
recommendation  
(Sell/Reduce)
SAR′  
p-value
SAR′
p-value
SAR′
p-value
Ta TCZ Ta TCZ Ta TCZ
191 events 252 events 133 events
–5 –0.176 0.021 0.104 –0.007 0.396 0.115 –0.072 0.282 0.389
–4 0.068 0.257 0.082 0.060 0.252 0.043 0.017 0.390 0.085
–3 0.039 0.344 0.175 –0.004 0.398 0.228 –0.071 0.285 0.367
–2 –0.056 0.295 0.360 –0.006 0.397 0.382 0.109 0.181 0.054
–1 0.068 0.256 0.099 –0.088 0.150 0.385 –0.062 0.307 0.247
0 0.291 0.013 0.000 –0.009 0.394 0.489 –0.238 0.010 0.112
1 0.210 0.006 0.000 –0.037 0.336 0.423 –0.153 0.085 0.159
2 0.151 0.045 0.015 0.017 0.384 0.096 –0.105 0.190 0.124
3 0.011 0.394 0.083 –0.060 0.255 0.368 –0.020 0.388 0.416
4 0.095 0.170 0.030 0.042 0.319 0.109 –0.029 0.377 0.494
5 0.076 0.229 0.026 0.045 0.307 0.046 –0.037 0.363 0.490
The results are contrary to those obtained by Gurgul and Majdosz (2004) but 
are consistent with the research of Mielcarz et. al (2007) and Podgórski and Miel-
carz (2008). The market seems to react more strongly to positive events than to 
negative ones. Neutral recommendations seem to have no impact on stock prices.
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3.2. Results from the analysis of changes in recommendation level 
Research conducted by other authors suggests that an analysis of changes 
in the level of recommendation is much more informative than an analysis of 
a pure recommendation level (e.g., Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh et al., 
2004; Murg and Zeitlberger, 2014). To check this assumption, recommendations 
are divided into nine clusters (as detailed in Table 3). In 526 out of 576 events, 
it was possible to assess the previous level of recommendation and define the 
change. Only changes from one of the three defined groups (positive, nega-
tive, neutral) to another are studied (e.g., from positive to negative). Changes 
inside the group (such as the change from ACCUMULATE to BUY or from SELL 
to REDUCE) are not researched. The number of recommendations in each of 
these groups is presented in Table 3. The most numerous is the group of neu-
tral recommendations that were previously also neutral (121 events – 23%). 
They are followed by positive events with no change (106 events – 20.2%). 
The least numerous are the most-extensive changes: from a positive to nega-
tive recommendation (19 events – 3.6%) and from a negative to positive one 
(13 events – 2.5%). 
Table 3
Recommendation changes. Only changes from one of three defined levels to another 
one are studied. Changes within the specified group (e.g., the change from SELL  
to REDUCE) are lost
Previous recommendation
Sum
positive neutral negative
Current  
recommendation
positive 106 50 13 169
neutral 66 121 47 234
negative 19 45 59 123
Sum 191 216 119 526
Results from the analysis of recommendation changes are presented in Table 4. 
The table contains mean-adjusted standardized abnormal returns SAR′( )  and 
p-values for both test statistics in the event window for nine groups of events. 
It can be noticed that positive recommendations are marked with a positive 
SAR′( )  from the day of the event to two days after it, regardless of the level of 
the previous recommendation. However, the strongest reaction is observed in 
the case of recommendations that were also previously positive. The TCZ statistic 
is significant at the 5% level on the day of the event as well as three other days 
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in the post-event window. The parametric t-statistic is significantly positive only 
two days after the recommendation. This indicates that new information is not 
immediately incorporated into the price but needs a few days to process. In the 
group of positive events that were previously neutral, only the nonparametric 
statistic is significantly positive at the 5% level on the day of the recommendation 
as well as the following day. Nevertheless, nonparametric test results are more 
reliable (as pointed out in Section 2). Changes from negative to positive do not 
show an immediate reaction to the information, as test statistics are insignificant 
on the days around the event. Only the TCZ statistic is significant at the 5% level 
four days after the recommendation. However, the size of the group (13 events) 
is too small to make conclusions on the basis of asymptotic distribution of this 
statistic. Results from the first three groups of recommendations can be summa-
rized as follows: the better the previous recommendation, the stronger positive 
reaction to the following one that is positive. This can be a signal that investors 
do not trust analysts if they change the recommendation upward to a positive 
one. However, if an analyst issues a second positive recommendation, this is 
interpreted as a credible sign of good company position. 
The impact of the neutral event on security prices varies depending on the 
level of the previous recommendation. A neutral recommendation preceded 
by a positive one is interpreted as a strongly negative signal. In this group of 
events, both test statistics are significantly negative at the 1% level on the day 
of the recommendation. Nonetheless, returns reveal counter movements in the 
post-event window, as they are positive on three days. The nonparametric test 
statistic is significantly positive at the 5% level on the second and fourth days 
after the event. It seems that investors overreact to this kind of change in a rec-
ommendation level. Stickel (1995) and Murg and Zeitlberger (2014) also find 
overreaction to some changes in the level of recommendation on other stock 
markets. A second neutral recommendation does not influence security prices. 
Test statistics are insignificant in the whole event window. As might be expected, 
a neutral recommendation occurring after negative one is interpreted as positive 
change. SAR′  are positive on the day of the event as well as the two following 
days. The significance of test statistics appears on the first and second days after 
the recommendation, which indicates that the information is gradually incor-
porated into the prices. The analysis of neutral recommendations conducted 
in the previous subsection suggested that a HOLD recommendation is indeed 
neutral and has no impact on prices. Research of the recommendation changes 
above shows that such a conclusion is too hasty and that the interpretation of 
a neutral recommendation depends on the previous recommendation level. If 
it was lower, the recommendation is interpreted as positive; if it was higher, the 
recommendation has a negative tenor.
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Negative recommendations are, on the whole, marked with a negative SAR′  
on the day of the event as well as the following day. In the group of changes from 
a positive recommendation to a negative, there are no significant values of test 
statistics. This group with the most extensive changes is simultaneously one of 
the least numerous, which precludes us from drawing reliable conclusions. In the 
case of negative recommendations preceded by neutral ones, SAR′  are negative 
to the fourth day after the recommendation. On day t = 3, both test statistics are 
significantly negative at the 5% level. Negative information about the downgrade 
of a recommendation level seems to need a few days to be incorporated into the 
price. A second negative recommendation does not significantly influence returns, 
which suggests that investors expected the repetition of negative information 
about the security.
Analysis of recommendation changes confirms the assumption that changes 
in the level of recommendation poses more-important information for investors 
than a pure recommendation level. Downgrades are interpreted as negative events 
and generally lower security prices, while upgrades constitute positive information 
and lead to an increase in returns. This finding is consistent with the research 
of Buzała (2012). Excluding positive recommendations, events marked with no 
recommendation change have no impact on prices. 
As an addendum of this research, an analogous one was conducted for the 
period analyzed by Buzała (2012), namely 2010–2011. The results are presented 
in the appendix. 
3.3. Results from the linear model with categorical variables
To research the occurrence of other factors that could influence a price reac-
tion to the recommendation, a linear regression model with categorical variables 
is fitted as follows:
 
CAR CHANGE CHANGE SHAREi j j j j0 2 0 1 1 21 1 2 2, , ,( ) = + ⋅ ( ) + ⋅ ( ) + ⋅ +α α χ α χ α
+ ⋅ ( ) + ⋅ ( )α χ α χ3 31 1 2 2, ,k k k kRANKING RANKING
 
Since price reaction to the recommendation can be generally noticed not only 
on the day of the event but also on the following days, the dependent value in 
the model is chosen as CARi(0,2), which stands for cumulative abnormal returns 
from the day of the event to the second day after it:
 
CAR ARi
i
it0 2
0
2
,( ) =
=
∑  
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CHANGE is the variable defining the change in the recommendation level. 
When we assign a value of 1 to a positive recommendation, a value of 0 to a neutral 
recommendation, and a value of 2 to a negative recommendation, then CHANGE 
ranges from form –2 to 2 (e.g., CHANGE = –2 in the case of a positive recom-
mendation preceded by a negative one). Only the movements between the three 
defined groups of positive, negative, and neutral events are analyzed (e.g., if the 
current recommendation is BUY and the previous was ACCUMULATE, the variable 
takes a value of 0). The variable SHARE stands for the natural logarithm of the 
company’s share in the WIG20 Index. RANKING is the variable that determines 
the reputation of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation. The variable 
is set to 2 when the brokerage firm is in the top position (from first to tenth) in 
both of two annual rankings conducted by Polish Forbes Magazine: the ranking 
created by individual investors and that made by institutional investors. A value of 
1 is assigned to firms that are in the top position in only one of those two rank-
ings. When the brokerage firm is not listed in either of the aforementioned two 
rankings or is positioned outside the top ten in both of them, the variable takes 
a value of 0. Function χi(x) means an indicator function that is:
 
χi x
x i
x i
( ) = =
≠

1
0
,
,
 
The model is fitted separately to positive, neutral, and negative recommenda-
tions. In effect, variable CHANGE takes only three values in each of the groups. 
The model researches significant changes in the levels of the categorical vari-
able with reference to one fixed level. For this reason, two sub-models should 
be employed in each group of events to capture the potential significance of all 
possible level changes. 
Intercept α0 corresponds to the situation in which both categorical variables 
are on the reference level. Then, coefficients α1 1, j  and α1 2, j  inform us how the 
intercept changes when CHANGE goes to levels j1  and j2, respectively. Analogously, 
coefficients α3 1,k and α3 2,k represent the change in the intercept when variable 
RANKING goes from the reference level to levels k1 or k2.
Fitted linear models are presented in Table 5. In the group of positive events, 
two coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Intercepts suggest that 
positive recommendations are generally seen as good news. A negative coefficient 
related to a variable SHARE implicates that the smaller the firm, the stronger its 
reaction to the recommendation. Neither the reputation of the brokerage house 
nor change in the level of recommendation seems to have a significant impact 
on the studied cumulative abnormal returns. Linear models do not confirm the 
remark from the event-study analysis that the reaction is the strongest in the case 
of the repetition of a positive recommendation. 
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Table 5
Coefficients of linear regression models with categorical variables fitted to positive, 
neutral, and negative recommendations separately. In each group, two sub-models were 
employed to capture potential significance of all possible level changes
Positive recommendations
Reference levels:  
CHANGE: 0, RANKING: 0.
Reference levels:  
CHANGE: 2, RANKING: 2.
Coefficient Estimate p-value Coefficient Estimate p-value
α0 0.0228** 0 α0 0.0245** 0.0046
α1,1 –0.0001 0.9787 α1,0 –0.0028 0.7344
α1,2 0.0028 0.7321 α1,1 –0.0029 0.7321
α2 –0.0087** 0.0005 α2 –0.0087** 0.0005
α3,1 –0.0017 0.07219 α3,0 0.0011 0.8337
α3,2 –0.0011 0.8337 α3,1 –0.0006 0.9135
Multiple R2: 0.0759
Neutral recommendations
Reference levels:  
CHANGE: –1, RANKING: 0.
Reference levels:   
CHANGE: 1, RANKING: 2.
Coefficient Estimate p-value Coefficient Estimate p-value
α0 –0.0063 0.2274 α0 0.0078 0.1967
α1,1 0.0002 0.9580 α1,–1 –0.0202** 0.0007
α,2 0.0202** 0.0007 α1,0 –0.0200** 0.0003
α2 0.0036 0.1159 α2 0.0036 0.1159
α3,1 –0.0023 0.6072 α3,0 0.0061 0.2675
α3,2 –0.0061 0.2675 α3,1 0.0037 0.5082
Multiple R2: 0.0714
Negative recommendations
Reference levels:  
HANGE: –2, RANKING: 0.
Reference levels: 
 CHANGE: 0, RANKING: 2.
Coefficient Estimate p-value Coefficient Estimate p-value
α0 –0.0432** 0.0003 α0 –0.0099 0.2793
α1,–1 –0.0022 0.1742 α1,–2 –0.0135 0.1742
α1,0 0.0135 0.8304 α1,–1 –0.0157* 0.0379
α2 0.0144** 0.0008 α2 0.0144** 0.0008
α,1 0.0160* 0.0428 α3,0 –0.0198* 0.0393
α,2 0.0198* 0.0393 α3,1 –0.0038 0.6670
Multiple R2: 0.1312
*, ** – significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively
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In the group of neutral events, variable CHANGE is the only one explanatory 
variable that influences cumulative abnormal returns. Coefficients related to this 
variable are significant at the 1% level. Fitted models affirm the results from the 
previous subsection: the perception of neutral recommendation depends on the 
previous level of the recommendation. There is a significant difference in investor 
reaction to a HOLD recommendation when it represents a decrease from BUY or 
ACCUMULATE as compared to the situation when it states an increase from SELL 
or REDUCE. Firm size represented by its share in the WIG20 Index as well as the 
reputation of the brokerage firm seem to have no explanatory power. 
The most statistically significant coefficients appear in models fitted to the 
group of negative recommendations. A negative intercept in the model with 
CHANGE at a reference level equal to −2 and with variable RANKING at level 0 
indicate that, in such a situation, SELL or REDUCE induces a negative price reaction. 
Assuming that negative recommendations are generally associated with negative 
returns, coefficient α2 that is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
confirms the hypothesis that smaller firms react more strongly (the bigger is the 
firm, the less negative the cumulative abnormal returns). Coefficients related to 
variable RANKING are statistically significant at the 5% level and suggest that the 
reputation of the brokerage house is an important factor that influences reaction 
to the recommendation. It does not matter whether the brokerage firm takes the 
top place in only one of the two considered rankings or in both of them, but 
the reaction is significantly different if the firm is not one of those with the best 
reputation. Interestingly, cumulative abnormal returns are more negative (the 
reaction is stronger) when the recommendation is prepared by firms with worse 
reputations. These findings do not confirm the results from other markets (Stickel, 
1995; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006). Since the relationship between price reaction 
and reputation of the brokerage firm was not proven in the two aforementioned 
groups of events, an unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn. A more-detailed 
analysis of this topic should be conducted. In the model with variable CHANGE at 
a reference level equal to 0 and variable RANKING equal to 2, one more statisti-
cally significant coefficient appears; namely α1,–1. Coefficient α1,–2 is not significant, 
which indicates that the reaction to a negative recommendation is similar when 
the previous recommendation was positive and when it was neutral. If, however, 
the previous recommendation was also SELL or REDUCE, the negative reaction 
is significantly weaker. Results from the event-study analysis conducted in the 
previous subsection also show a dissimilarity of investor reaction to negative 
events according to the level of the previous recommendation. Conclusions were 
slightly different, but it should be noticed that the test statistics were significant 
on the third day after the event, while in regression models, only two days after 
the recommendation are counted.
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To sum up, results from the linear regression model are generally consistent 
with those from the event-study analysis. Additionally, they confirm the findings 
from other markets (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Murg and Zeitlberger, 
2014; Murg et al., 2014) that the reaction to the recommendation depends on 
the size of the company and is stronger in the case of smaller firms. A direct and 
clear relationship between brokerage house reputation and reaction to the rec-
ommendation was not found.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, the impact of analyst recommendations to the prices of stocks 
listed on the Polish WIG20 Index is researched. The data covers the period of 
January 2012 to September 2015. To investigate the strength and the speed of the 
reaction, an event-study analysis is employed. Abnormal returns are calculated 
with the use of a market model based on daily data. Additionally, a linear regres-
sion model with categorical variables is employed to investigate potential factors 
that influence investor reaction to recommendations.
An initial study of recommendations clustered in three levels (positive, 
neutral, and negative) shows that the sign of abnormal returns around the 
day of the event is generally consistent with the information contained in the 
recommendation, and that the strongest reaction is observed in the group of 
positive recommendations. Test statistics in this cluster are significant to the 
fifth day after the event, which suggests that prices do not incorporate infor-
mation immediately. In the case of negative events, abnormal returns remain 
negative to the fifth day after the recommendation. Nonetheless, the reaction 
is weaker than in the case of positive events, as most of these abnormal returns 
are statistically insignificant.
The analysis of level changes confirms the hypothesis that change in the level 
of recommendation (regarding the previous one) is the informative factor that 
influences investor behavior and, as a consequence, stock prices. Reaction to 
a positive recommendation is the strongest when the recommendation was also 
previously positive. This can be a sign that investors trust analysts more when 
they confirm their previous positive recommendation than when they raise their 
recommendation to positive. When the initial analysis does not prove any sig-
nificant reactions to neutral recommendations, the study of level changes shows 
that reaction to this kind of event depends strongly on the level of the previous 
recommendation. HOLD preceded by SELL or REDUCE sets a positive event, 
while a previous recommendation of BUY or ACCUMULATE results in a reaction 
to a subsequent HOLD that is negative. 
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Negative recommendations do not influence stock prices as strongly as posi-
tive ones (although, they generally lead to negative abnormal returns). Statistically, 
nonzero abnormal returns three days after the event are found only in the group 
of negative events that were previously neutral. 
A linear regression model with categorical variables employed separately 
to positive, neutral, and negative events confirms the conclusions from the 
event study. Particularly, the model demonstrates that the level of the previous 
recommendation has a strong impact on the reaction to a neutral recommenda-
tion. Furthermore, the model discloses that the size of the firm (represented 
by its shares in the WIG20 Index) sets an important factor in the analysis of 
reaction to a recommendation, as the reaction is stronger when the company 
is smaller. A counter-intuitive relationship between brokerage firm reputation 
and the reaction to a recommendation was found in the group of negative 
events. Results suggest that a worse reputation leads to a stronger price reac-
tion. Since such a relationship does not appear in other groups of events, the 
subject needs more detailed research. A direct and clear conclusion that the 
reputation of a brokerage house influences reaction to its recommendation 
cannot be drawn. 
5. Appendix
5.1. Study of the period previously researched –  
comparison of applied methods
To check whether the method applied in this research supports the results 
from foregoing studies, the period of 2010–2011 previously analyzed by Buzała 
(2012) is additionally researched. The dataset contains 441 absolute analyst recom-
mendations for 23 companies listed in the WIG20 Index from the 1st of January 
2010 to the 31st of December 2011.
Despite the fact that expected returns are calculated identically as those 
made by Buzała (2012) (with the classical market model), the studies differ sig-
nificantly. Buzała (2012) analyzes average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
from 15 days before the recommendation to 30 days after it and checks their 
statistical significance. He considers nine types of events: five of them represent 
the recommendation level (SELL, REDUCE, HOLD, ACCUMULATE, BUY), and the 
other represent level changes: upgrades, downgrades, and additionally specified 
upgrades to BUY and downgrades to SELL. His sample is much more numerous 
(1185 recommendations). In this study, the sample is cut down to 441 events to 
eliminate those that are too close in terms of event study methodology.
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5.2. The analysis of three standard recommendation levels
The results from the analysis of three standard recommendation levels are 
presented in Table 6. For positive and negative events, the immediate reaction of 
the market can be observed, which is consistent with the information contained in 
the recommendation. Both test statistics are significantly positive at the 1% level 
on the day of the publication. For positive recommendations, the non-parametric 
statistic in also significant at the 1% level on the following day and five days be-
fore the event. This positive reaction before publication of the recommendation 
could be a signal of potential information leakage, but from fourth to second 
days before the event, mean adjusted standardized abnormal returns SAR′( )  are 
negative (one of them is even statistically significant in terms of the parametrical 
test), which suggests that there could be some confounding events. For negative 
recommendations, all SAR′  in the event window are negative; but besides the 
day of the recommendation, a non-parametric test indicates abnormal returns 
statistically significant at the 5% level only on the fifth day after the event.
In the group of neutral events, the sign of SAR′  changes again and again. 
The parametric test indicates statistically significant abnormal returns only before 
the recommendation: positive (at the 1% level) on the fifth day before the event 
and negative (at the 5% level) one day before it. A non-parametric test that, as 
previously mentioned, is more credible suggests only a positive reaction (at the 
1% level) five days before the event, on the event day, and three days after it. The 
results from the non-parametric test could be interpreted as information that neu-
tral recommendations are perceived as positive. However, negative returns that 
are not significant but still appear between those that are positive seem to deny 
such a conclusion. These inconsistent results are not surprising. As presented 
in Chapter 3 (for the period of 2012–2015), the reaction of investors to neutral 
recommendation can depend strongly on its previous level, and the analysis of 
level changes will probably lead to more-transparent results.
The aforementioned results are partly consistent with those obtained by 
Buzała (2012). He does not observe any market reaction to neutral events (HOLD) 
but finds a strong reaction to BUY and SELL recommendations (consistent with 
the information contained in the recommendation). For these two most-extreme 
levels, Buzała (2012) also observes a permanent accumulation of ACAR that starts 
10 days before the event and lasts until about the 15th day after it. This drift ap-
pearing before the publication of recommendation is interpreted as a signal that 
recommendations were previously known to some group of investors who affect 
the market. Examining recommendations separately with the first submission to 
a limited group of investors, he finds a statistically significant ACAR even before 
this first publication. However, in the case of such recommendations, the reac-
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tion to their subsequent publication on the Internet is weaker. In our study, we 
do not observe such a significant and unequivocal market reaction anticipating 
the event date. Nevertheless, in the case of negative events, all SAR′  are nega-
tive (although not statistically significant), which can be perceived as supporting 
Buzała’s results.
Table 6
Reaction of daily returns to particular types of analyst recommendations (positive, neutral, 
and negative) issued between the 1st of January 2010 and the 31st of December 2011 
t
Positive  
recommendation  
(Buy/Accumulate)
Neutral  
recommendation  
(Hold)
Negative  
recommendation  
(Sell/Reduce)
SAR′
p-value
SAR′
p-value
SAR′
p-value
Ta TCZ Ta TCZ Ta TCZ
189 events 190 events 63 events
–5 0.110 0.0639 0.001 0.178 0.0063 0.001 –0.045 0.3657 0.178
–4 –0.073 0.1781 0.469 0.024 0.3727 0.078 –0.100 0.2787 0.277
–3 –0.133 0.0276 0.261 –0.025 0.3588 0.472 –0.139 0.1482 0.258
–2 –0.019 0.3758 0.269 0.036 0.3400 0.070 –0.046 0.3721 0.437
–1 0.018 0.3812 0.118 –0.142 0.0310 0.247 –0.091 0.2526 0.340
0 0.206 0.0078 0.000 0.137 0.0680 0.006 –0.477 0.0006 0.001
1 0.102 0.1499 0.006 –0.069 0.2524 0.399 –0.111 0.2706 0.494
2 0.044 0.3328 0.158 –0.037 0.3484 0.266 –0.075 0.3333 0.403
3 –0.033 0.3586 0.353 0.096 0.1656 0.009 –0.007 0.3967 0.365
4 –0.006 0.3969 0.113 –0.130 0.0798 0.313 –0.124 0.2460 0.333
5 0.067 0.2615 0.081 0.038 0.3466 0.271 –0.256 0.0541 0.044
5.3. The analysis of changes in the recommendation level
The research conducted for the changes in the recommendation level differs 
significantly from the corresponding study of Buzała (2012). In this research, 
only three recommendation levels are defined (BUY and ACCUMULATE as well 
as SELL and REDUCE are gathered in joint groups defined as positive and nega-
tive events, respectively), and only changes between the three levels are studied. 
Buzała (2012) takes into account all five recommendation levels (for a change), 
but he does not consider each of the possible changes separately. As previously 
mentioned, he jointly researches all upgrades as well as all downgrades and then 
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additionally considers upgrades to BUY and downgrades to SELL. Hence, for ex-
ample, the change from ACCUMULATE to BUY is assigned by Buzała to upgrades, 
while in this research, such an event is clustered in the group of positive events 
that were previously also positive (so, to the group with no level change). Such 
substantial differences in definitions of recommendation levels and their changes 
significantly hinders a comparison of the results. 
For all groups of level changes, Buzała (2012) observes progressive accu-
mulation of statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns that starts about 
5 days before the first issue of the recommendation and lasts even to the 30th day 
after it. The sign of the return is, in each case, consistent with the information 
contained in the recommendation. The reaction is the strongest in the groups of 
upgrades to BUY and downgrades to SELL. Moreover, the values of CARs suggest 
that negative events (SELL and downgrades) influence prices more significantly 
than positive ones (BUY and upgrades).
Detailed results from conducted analysis of recommendation-level changes 
are not presented here since the article would be too long, but these can be 
provided upon request. In general, they confirm Buzała’s results that stock prices 
react to changes in the recommendation level and that the reaction is consistent 
with the direction of the change. Nevertheless, they do not show clear evidence 
of a significant reaction before the recommendation issue and do not lead to the 
inference that the reaction is stronger in the case of downgrades. A direct com-
parison comes up against difficulties associated with differences in the applied 
methods of research.
An analysis of the whole period of 2010–2015 was also conducted by the 
author. The results do not vary considerably from those discussed in this paper 
and can be presented upon request.
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